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JURY DISCRIMINATION

JURY DISCRIMINATION
Jury discrimination was first recognized as a constitutional
problem shortly after the CIVIL WAR, when certain southern
and border states excluded blacks from jury service. The
Supreme Court had little difficulty in holding such blatant
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION invalid as a denial of the EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS guaranteed by the recently adopted
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. But, beyond such obvious improprieties, what should the principle of nondiscrimination forbid? Some kinds of ‘‘discrimination’’ in the
selection of the jury are not bad but good: for example,
those incompetent to serve ought to be excused from service, whether their incompetence arises from mental or
physical defect, from demonstrably bad character, or from
bias. No one has seriously argued that American jury service ought to be determined wholly by lot, as it was among
the citizens of Athens. In addition, it has been the uniform
policy of American jurisdictions to excuse from service
some who are competent, but whose service would work
a hardship on them or others: doctors, ministers, and parents who care for small children have been exempted from
service on such grounds.
The history of the constitutional law regulating jury
composition has been a story of expanding and compulsory
democratization. In our early national history property
and voting qualifications were common, and women were
systematically excluded or exempted from jury service. At
COMMON LAW, indeed, special juries were sometimes employed: a jury of merchants to decide certain kinds of mercantile questions, for example, or in the trial of an ALIEN,
a jury half of which spoke his language. Even in the early
and middle decades of this century, the Supreme Court
upheld against constitutional attack a BLUE RIBBON JURY system, by which jurors were selected supposedly for intelligence and character in a way that resulted in the vast
overrepresentation of professional and business classes, in
Fay v. New York (1947); a highly discretionary and easily
abused ‘‘key man’’ system for selecting potential jurors by
consultation with community leaders, in SWAIN V. ALABAMA
(1965); and the voluntary exemption of women from jury
service, in Hoyt v. Florida (1961). At present, however, a
federal statute requires that the federal jury be drawn
from a pool that represents a ‘‘fair cross section of the
community,’’ and a similar constitutional standard has
been imposed by the Supreme Court on the states as well,
in TAYLOR V. LOUISIANA (1975).
There are normally three stages in the selection of an
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American jury at which improper discrimination may occur: the establishment of the master list of all persons eligible for jury service within the JURISDICTION of a
particular court (this is called the jury roll); the selection
of the panel of potential jurors (called the venire) who will
be asked to appear at the courthouse; and the selection
from that panel of those who will actually serve on a jury
in a particular case or set of cases. The question of discrimination can arise in both civil and criminal cases, but
the courts have paid far more attention to the criminal
jury. Two distinct provisions of the Constitution of the
United States bear upon jury selection: the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the SIXTH
AMENDMENT.
In STRAUDER V. WEST VIRGINIA (1879) and NEAL V. DELAWARE (1880) the Court held that the equal protection
clause forbade a state to try a black defendant by a jury
from which members of his race had been affirmatively
excluded, either by statute or by administrative practice.
A federal statute passed shortly after the Civil War made
such discrimination a crime.
In Hernandez v. Texas (1954), dealing with the exclusion of Mexican Americans, the Supreme Court extended
the Strauder ruling to other ethnic groups. On the other
hand, the Court has repeatedly said that the Constitution
does not entitle a defendant to a jury that consists in whole
or in part of members of his race, or of any other particular
composition. The idea of the jury affirmed in these cases
is not that it is a microcosm of society at large, but that it
is an institution of justice for which participants may properly be required to be qualified. The equal protection
clause does not guarantee a particular mix but protects
only against improper exclusions.
What exclusions, beyond racial ones, are improper? In
Hernandez the Court said that where any group in a community is systematically discriminated against it will need
the protection of the Constitution, and added: ‘‘Whether
such a group exists within a community is a question of
fact. When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the laws, as written or
as applied, single out that class for different treatment not
based upon some reasonable classification, the guarantees
of the Constitution have been violated.’’ But what is a reasonable classification? This question is complicated by the
fact that the law has traditionally imposed qualifications
for jury service which may, or may not, have differential
impact on racial or other protected groups. The Court has
accordingly upheld, against equal protection attack, qualifications for jury service that are extremely vague and easily susceptible to abuse—‘‘generally reputed to be honest
and intelligent . . . esteemed in the community for their
integrity, good character, and good judgment.’’ The burden is on the defendant to show that such qualifications

1510

JURY DISCRIMINATION

have in fact been abused. Generally speaking, racially disproportionate impact alone is not enough to invalidate a
classification under the equal protection clause: actual intent to discriminate must be proved, by direct or circumstantial evidence, as the Court held in WASHINGTON V. DAVIS
(1976). But in jury discrimination, proof of a substantial
disproportionality in racial (or sexual) balance between the
jury pool and the community at large constitutes a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination which the government must rebut. (The Sixth Amendment is more protective than the equal protection clause, in those cases to
which it applies, for it has no intent requirement, and the
Court held in Duren v. Missouri (1979) that it not only
prohibits discrimination but affirmatively requires that the
pool from which the jury is drawn contain a ‘‘fair cross
section’’ of the relevant community.)
Who may object to an improper exclusion? In Peters v.
Kiff (1972), the Supreme Court held that any defendant
is entitled to object to improper exclusions from the panel
from which his jury is selected, whether or not he is a
member of the excluded race. In addition, the Court held
in Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County (1976)
that members of the excluded race who wish to serve on
juries are entitled to bring independent proceedings to
attack their exclusion, for they are deprived of equal protection with respect to an important right of CITIZENSHIP.
A separate source of constitutional restrictions on jury
discrimination is the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an
‘‘impartial jury’’ in criminal cases. DUNCAN V. LOUISIANA
(1968) held that this provision, which originally applied
only to the federal government, was ‘‘incorporated’’ within
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, and
thus was applicable to the states as well. (See INCORPORATION DOCTRINE.) In Taylor v. Louisiana the Court held that
the concept of the jury as a ‘‘fair cross section of the community’’ was at the core of the Sixth Amendment and thus
applicable to the states. Thus exclusions will be tested not
merely under the equal protection clause, which focuses
on improper exclusions, but by the affirmative ‘‘cross section’’ principle. The latter principle conceives of the jury
not as a group of citizens who are qualified for a task and
chosen in a manner free from INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION,
but as a body fairly chosen from a group that represents
the community of which it is a part.
But what does ‘‘fairly chosen’’ mean? The federal statute requires that the jury roll reflect a fair cross section of
the community, and that the venire be drawn at random
from the roll; this scheme meets any standard of fairness.
The courts might impose similar standards on the states.
But there remains the crucial stage at which the particular
jury panel is selected from the venire, and none of the
rulings cited above speak to this matter. This selection is
made just before trial in a process in which lawyers and

the judge cooperate. Certain jurors are excused ‘‘for
cause,’’ that is, because there are good reasons why they
should not sit in the particular case: admitted bias, acquaintance with one of the parties, and so on. In addition,
the parties are allowed a limited number of discretioniary,
or ‘‘peremptory,’’ challenges to other potential jurors.
What happens if the prosecution should exercise its peremptory challenges to keep blacks or women off the jury?
If that can be done with impunity, the insistence upon
fairness at the other stages of jury selection becomes an
empty ritual; but how can a discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges be established? To require the prosecutor to accept any juror of a particular race or class
would be unfair to the state, and upset the balance of the
selection process. The Supreme Court held in Swain v.
Alabama that the use of peremptory challenges against
potential minority jurors is not always unconstitutional,
but that systematic racial discrimination is impermissible
under the equal protection clause. In Batson v. Kentucky
(1986) the Court partially overruled Swain, holding that a
prosecutor cannot constitutionally use peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors solely on account of
their race. If the circumstances raise an inference of such
a use of peremptory challenges, the burden shifts to the
state to provide ‘‘a neutral explanation’’ for the exclusions.
The effect of the antidiscrimination holdings has also
been undercut by the Supreme Court’s decision in APODACA V. OREGON (1972) that the states are not required to
insist upon unanimous verdicts. (See JURY UNANIMITY.)
Even if some members of a discriminated-against class
make it to the jury, Apodaca means that their views can
be disregarded by the majority. On the other hand, the
proposition that jurors of the defendant’s race or sex will
be especially likely to vote for him is an assumption more
easily made than proved, and arguably demeaning both to
the jurors and to the class to which they belong. And even
minority jurors who are outvoted will have a chance to
have their views considered. The true basis of the fair
cross-section requirement is assurance of the kind of diversity of view and experience that will most advance the
kind of collective decision making that, as Harry Kalven
and Hans Zeisel show, represents the jury at its best.
As for the distinct institution known as the GRAND JURY,
which sits before trial to decide whether the evidence of
a particular defendant’s guilt is sufficient to justify his INDICTMENT, racial discrimination in its selection is also a
violation of the equal protection clause. The indicted individual is entitled to the dismissal of his indictment, as
the Court held in Carter v. Texas (1900), even though in
some sense the defect may be thought to be cured by a
properly composed trial jury. The Court has not applied
the affirmative ‘‘fair cross section’’ requirements to the
state grand jury, nor indeed, as the Court held in HURTADO
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(1884), are the states required to employ
the institution of the grand jury at all. Discrimination in the
selection of state grand juries remains regulated by the
equal protection clause, which forbids only intentional discrimination. The federal statute does apply the ‘‘fair cross
section’’ requirement to federal grand juries as well as trial
juries.
The continued existence of both the grand jury and the
trial jury appears to rest on two assumptions. First, judicial
decisions, especially in criminal cases, are assumed to be
more just when they are not left to professionals but are
also influenced by the views of ordinary people. Second,
jury service—again, especially in the criminal process—
is seen as popular participation in government. Our constitutional protections against discriminatory selection of
jurors are aimed at promoting the ends of justice and the
ideal of citizenship.
JAMES BOYD WHITE
(1986)
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